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SNARES, SNAGS, AND SPRING-GUNS:1
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PRE-AWARD
BID PROTESTS FOR VIOLATIONS
OF A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST STATUTE
Conflicts of interest in the federal procurement process have long engaged
the attention of Congress, courts, and federal agency officials.2 The term
"conflict of interest" stems from the Biblical maxim that "a man cannot
serve two masters." 3 In government contracting, the term describes a rela-
tionship between a bidding contractor and a government procuring officer
that is inconsistent with a competitive government contracting process.4 A
procurement official-private contractor conflict of interest falls somewhere
between associations that are inconsequential, and those that amount to
bribery and graft.' Accordingly, Congress created conflict of interest stat-
utes that govern a person's pre-employment, present employment, and post-
employment dealings with the United States Government.6 These statutes
1. As early as 1952, one scholar warned of problems that might occur if Congress were
to develop too many rules and regulations applicable to the United States Government
procurement process. That authority stated, "[t]here is a danger that in attempting to legislate
morals we are likely to surround the Government service with so many snares, snags and
spring-guns that only the unwary can be recruited." McElwain & Vorenberg, The Federal
Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARV. L. REV. 955, 955 (1952) (emphasis added).
2. Federal Conflict of Interest Legislation, 1961: Hearings on H.R. 302, H.R. 3050, H.R.
3411, H.R. 3412, and H.R. 7139 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 8th Cong., Sess. 1 (1961) [hereinafter Hearings]; see also Vaughn, Ethics in Govern-
ment and the Vision of Public Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 419 (1990) (tracing "cor-
ruption" in American political life to the time of the founding of our Constitution).
3. Matthew 6:24. The concept is readily apparent in common law rules which govern
the master-servant, principal-agent, fiduciary-beneficiary, and attorney-client relationships.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Hearings; supra note 2, at 1. Here, the Biblical maxim provides only the vaguest
guidance.
5. Id. "A conflict of interest may exist when there is a clash, or the appearance of a
clash, between (a) the interest of a Government official in properly performing his official du-
ties, and (b) the official's interest in his private affairs . . . ." Pasley, Individual Conflicts of
Interest: Basic Principles and Guidelines, 64 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR BRIEFING PA-
PERS 1 (1964) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
6. Congress has enacted both criminal and civil conflict of interest statutes. One such
criminal statute prohibits a former government employee from acting as an agent or represen-
tative in a matter where the employee "participated personally and substantially" while work-
ing for the government. 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) (West Supp. 1990) (amended 1989, effective
Jan. 1, 1991). Another criminal statute applies to higher level employees and prohibits, for a
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do not proscribe all relationships, activities, and interests associated with the
normal process of doing business.7 Rather, the statutes address activities
that damage the integrity of the procurement system' and deprive the gov-
ernment of the full performance of a contract.9
Despite Congress' lengthy discourse on which relationships and activities
it intended the statutes to prevent, the legislative branch gave little guidance
as to the scope of the remedies available in contract award controversies
where a party alleges a violation of a conflict of interest statute.' 0 From the
legislative history of the conflict of interest statutes, however, courts have
carved out two available remedies: monetary relief in the form of bid prepa-
ration costs," and injunctive relief. 2
period of two years, any involvement, including representation, counsel or advice. Id.
§ 207(b). A third statute which carries a criminal penalty prohibits a government employee
from participating "personally and substantially" in matters in which the employee has a fi-
nancial interest. Id. § 208. One civil conflict of interest statute requires certain former De-
partment of Defense military personnel to file a report if a contractor who receives $10,000,000
or more per year in defense contract awards employs the person. 10 U.S.C.A. § 2397 (West
Supp. 1990). A second civil statute prohibits former civilian government officials who partici-
pated substantially in any federal agency procurement from participating in negotiations for
the award of that contract and from participating substantially in the performance of that
contract for a period of two years. 41 U.S.C.A. § 423(e) (West Supp. 1990). This article
covers the statutes governing Department of Energy employees, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7215, 7216
(1988).
7. The statutes do not prevent all contact between a government employee and a con-
tracting officer. For example, in a negotiated procurement where a contracting officer may
have "meaningful discussions" with an offeror, government employees such as contracting
officers will necessarily have more contact with the contractors than they would in a sealed-bid
procurement. Generally, a contracting officer has broad discretion in the conduct of discus-
sions with offerors. See J. CIBINIC & R. NASH, FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
614 (2d ed. 1986).
8. "The necessity for maintaining high ethical standards of behavior in the Government
becomes greater as its activities become more complex and bring it into closer and closer con-
tact with the private sector of the Nation's economy." S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3852, 3853.
9. Hearings, supra note 2, at 1.
10. One of the few statements that Congress made addressing specifically the Claims
Court's injunctive power is that "[t]he courts ordinarily refrain from interference with the
procurement process by declining to enjoin the Government from awarding a contract to a
contractor which the Government has selected." S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11, 33.
11. The protestor usually seeks award of the contract. Courts, however, rarely grant in-
junctive relief. The alternative is monetary relief in the form of bid preparation costs and/or
attorney's fees. Bid preparation costs are costs that the bidder incurred in preparing the bid or
proposal. See J. CIBINIC & R. NASH, supra note 7, at 1043.
Even more uncommon than injunctive relief is the recovery of anticipated profits. See Keco
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (noting that an award of lost
profits for a contract that does not exist is improper).
12. See Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (describing
the elements of an injunction). Disappointed bidders bring two types of protests: pre-award
[Vol. 39:12391240
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Injunctive relief is drastic in terms of its effect on the operating efficiency
of the procurement process. A preliminary injunction prevents the award of
the contract. Without an award, the contractor cannot fulfill the govern-
ment's requirements as articulated in the contract.' 3 A permanent injunc-
tion may require the government to resolicit' 4 the contract, which starts the
procurement process all over again. Therefore, courts usually defer to a gov-
ernment agency's contract award decision because of the intrusive nature of
injunctive relief and the lack of clear congressional intent regarding that
remedy. 5 By upholding agency decisions, the courts avoid the difficult issue
of setting an appropriate remedy in bid protest cases.16
This Comment analyzes the primary judicial pronouncements on injunc-
tive relief for violations of a conflict of interest statute. First, this Comment
examines United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co. 7 to demonstrate
the United States Supreme Court's view of conflict of interest statutes. Then,
to ascertain when the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
will affirm a lower court's decision to intervene in the procurement process,
this Comment analyzes the Federal Circuit's application of Mississippi Val-
ley. Next, the Comment discusses the legislative history of the United States
protests and post-award protests. If the disappointed bidder brings a claim after the govern-
ment has awarded the contract, the protest is a post-award protest. In post-award cases, the
disappointed bidder must file in some forum other than the Claims Court. See J. CIBINIC & R.
NASH, supra note 7, at 1010.
The other type of protest is a pre-award protest. The disappointed bidder brings the protest
before the government awards the contract. The Claims Court can only hear pre-award bid
protests. See United States v. John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explain-
ing the Federal Circuit's ruling on post-award disputes). The Claims Court, implementing the
Federal Circuit's ruling, routinely holds that post-award disputes are not part of its jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Space Age Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 739 (1984).
Pre-award bid protests may be brought in the United States Claims Court, the General
Accounting Office, and the General Services Board of Contract Appeals. See J. CIBINIC & R.
NASH, supra note 7, at 1029-34. There is a split among the district courts as to whether
injunctive relief can be granted in pre-award bid protests brought to the district courts. Com-
pare Price v. United States, 894 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court had no
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief) with Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. United States, 833 F.2d
1052, 1057-58 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the district courts retained jurisdiction over pre-
award bid protest cases).
13. Pending the court's decision on the permanent injunction, the government halts all
action with regard to the contract. The court may mandate a resolicitation of the contract
which requires the agency to start the procurement process all over again. With either version
of injunctive relief, the court interrupts the procurement process.
14. Courts can grant this remedy as an alternative to preventing the award. In a resolic-
itation, the procuring agency returns the offerors' proposals and sends out a new solicitation.
See J. CIBINIC & R. NASH, supra note 7, at 1042.
15. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
17. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
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Claims Court's injunctive power and the applicable conflict of interest stat-
utes to determine the circumstances under which Congress intended for the
Claims Court to grant injunctive relief in a conflict of interest case. This
Comment supports the Claims Court's decision in TRW Environmental
Safety Systems, Inc. v. United States, Is which held that where there is a clear
violation of a conflict of interest statute, the potential contract award is inva-
lid. Finally, this Comment concludes that although it is questionable
whether Congress should, or can, legislate ethics and morals,19 the fact re-
mains that Congress' mandate, as interpreted and articulated in Mississippi
Valley, requires courts to enforce conflict of interest statutes by preventing
the award of such "tainted" contracts.2 °
I. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY: A RULE INTENDED TO PREVENT THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
The leading United States Supreme Court decision on the cancellation of
government contracts tainted by the appearance of a conflict of interest is
United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Company.21 In Mississippi
Valley, the Supreme Court reversed a Court of Claims decision in favor of a
contractor for the government's breach of a $1.8 million contract.22 The
Supreme Court's holding turned on its interpretation of and application of
18 U.S.C. § 434, a conflict of interest statute23 that prohibited government
employees from participating in contract award decisions in which the em-
18. 18 Cl. Ct. 33, 74 (1989), appeal docketed, No. 90-5013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1989).
19. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 3. In periods of peace, Congress tends to legislate
morals and ethics in government procurement. In periods of war, Congress tends to carve out
exceptions and exemptions from conflict of interest statutes on the theory that the statutes
should not deter the best and brightest from accepting public office. Id. at 20.
Scholars often question whether it is possible to legislate morals. One argument is that it is
not possible to legislate morality given "that the public gets the kind of government it tolerates;
[and] that corruption in high places, when it occurs, merely reflects degeneration of public
morality." Id. at 3-4. Other scholars, however, make a strong argument for legislating moral-
ity, suggesting that civilized society has always done so as the existence of criminal codes
evidences. Thus, Congress has no less reason here than elsewhere to prohibit what is socially
intolerant. Id.
20. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 565.
21. Id
22. Id. at 566.
23. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 703 (repealed 1962). The original predecessor
of 18 U.S.C. § 434 (1948) dates back to 1863. The criminal laws were generally revised in
1909. In 1948, Congress made substantive revisions and consolidated the criminal code
adopted as Title 18. Finally, Congress broadened the conflict of interest statutes in 1962 and
revised section 434 to its current form, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1962). See B. MANNING,
FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW (1964) (providing an excellent history of conflict of
interest legislation).
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ployee had a financial interest.24 The Mississippi Valley controversy grew
out of a contract between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the
Mississippi Valley Generating Company (Mississippi Valley) for the con-
struction of an electric power plant.25 Eight months after Mississippi Valley
began performance on the contract, the AEC cancelled the contract under
orders from President Eisenhower,26 who had determined that the govern-
ment no longer required the power that the proposed plant would have gen-
erated.27 Mississippi Valley sued the United States in the Court of Claims to
recover money that the company had already expended in connection with
the contract.28
As an affirmative defense, the government argued that Mississippi Valley
could not sue to enforce the contract because a part-time government em-
ployee had violated section 434, which rendered the contract illegal.29 The
government's defense stemmed from the conduct of Adolphe Wenzell, a
part-time government employee. In addition to working for the government,
Wenzell also worked for First Boston,30 the most likely source of financing
for the project.3" AEC had recruited Wenzell's services as an uncompen-
sated consultant to the government for the purpose of negotiating with Mis-
sissippi Valley regarding interest costs and financing.32 As a representative
of the government, Wenzell negotiated with Mississippi Valley officers;3 3 as
24. The statute requires:
Whoever, being an officer, agent or member of, or directly or indirectly interested
in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation, joint-stock company, or as-
sociation, or of any firm or partnership, or other business entity, is employed or acts
as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business with such
business entity, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 434 (1948) (repealed 1962).
Judge Cudahy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court, in Mississippi Valley, gave the "broadest possible interpretation" to section
434 while Congress was considering the need for change in the conflict of interest laws. United
States v. Irons, 640 F.2d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 1981).
25. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 524. The contract required Mississippi Valley to con-
struct and operate a $100,000,000 steam power plant in the Memphis, Tennessee area. The
plant would supply electrical energy to the Atomic Energy Commission. Id. at 523.
26. Id. at 532. After the AEC identified the need for the plant, the City of Memphis
decided to construct a municipal power plant. President Eisenhower asked the AEC to deter-
mine whether the government should terminate the contract for lack of need. Several weeks
later, the President terminated the contract without considering the AEC's position. Id
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id at 524.
30. Id
31. Id at 532.
32. Id at 538.
33. Id at 541.
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a First Boston Vice President, Wenzell advised Mississippi Valley of financ-
ing rates.34 In addition, First Boston had previously financed a number of
significant power plants. For this reason, it was likely that First Boston
could expect to handle some, if not all, of Mississippi Valley's financing
needs. 35 The alleged conflict of interest did not impress the Court of
Claims,36 however, and the court found for the plaintiff, Mississippi
Valley.
Reversing the judgment of the Court of Claims, the United States
Supreme Court held that Wenzell violated the conflict of interest statute.38
Noting that termination of the contract would require the government to
pay substantial reimbursement costs for Mississippi Valley's expenses, 39 the
Court stated that the public should be protected from "corruption which
might lie undetectable beneath the surface of a contract conceived in a
tainted transaction."'  The Court summarily rejected Mississippi Valley's
34. Id. The cost of money is the interest paid on the capital used to finance the project.
That amount represents a large part of the overall cost of the project. Mississippi Valley was
in competition for the project with a public utility, namely, the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA). TVA gets its money, interest free, from federally appropriated funds. Thus, Missis-
sippi Valley had to have an unusually low interest rate in order to compete. A. WILDAVSKY,
DIXON-YATES: A STUDY IN POWER POLITICS 55 (1962).
35. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 556. At the time of the controversy, Adolphe Wenzell
had been working with First Boston, its predecessors, and the top management officials for
over twenty-five years. Wenzell and his colleagues had developed a dislike for public utilities
because First Boston frequently financed private utility projects. Wenzell had characterized
TVA as "galloping socialism." A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 34, at 24-25.
36. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 524.
37. Id. Wenzell's failure to resign did not impress the Court of Claims. Judge Madden
said: "We think that Wenzell's failure to resign ostentatiously and immediately, as a lawyer
might have done, is of no significance." Mississippi Valley v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 505,
519 (Ct. Cl. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
38. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 563.
39. Id. Termination costs were estimated at $3.5 million. This would simply be calcu-
lated as the amount due to Mississippi Valley for out-of-pocket expenses. A. WILDAVSKY,
supra note 34, at 283; see also infra note 208 (discussing termination costs).
40. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 565.
The obvious purpose of the statute is to insure honesty in the Government's busi-
ness dealings by preventing federal agents who have interests adverse to those of the
Government from advancing their own interests at the expense of public welfare.
The moral principle upon which the statute is based has its foundation in the Biblical
admonition that no man may serve two masters, a maxim which is especially perti-
nent if one of the masters happens to be economic self-interest. ...
... The statute is thus directed not only at dishonor, but also at conduct that
tempts dishonor. This broad proscription embodies a recognition of the fact that an
impairment of impartial judgment can occur in even the most well-meaning men
when their personal economic interests are affected by the business they transact on
behalf of the Government.
Id at 548-49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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argument that nonenforcement of the contract would be too harsh, even
though Mississippi Valley could not recover the costs already expended in
the course of performing the contract.41 Rather, the Court emphasized the
importance of maintaining the integrity of the federal contracting process,
and allowed the government to disaffirm the contract.42 Thus, according to
the Supreme Court, the purpose of the conflict of interest statute demanded
that courts disaffirm the contract when contracting parties violate section
434.43
Mississippi Valley allows the government to disaffirm a contract where an
appearance of impropriety exists because of a potential conffict of interest
between the government and the contractor. Lower courts have applied
Mississippi Valley to criminal and civil conffict of interest statutes, to the
government and the disappointed bidder, and to pre-award and post-award
contract controversies. 44 Because of the varied application of the standard,
41. Id (noting that the Court must extend to the public the protection that Congress
mandated by enacting section 434). With the termination of the Mississippi Valley contract
inevitable, concerns turned to termination costs. The controversy was wrought with political
underpinnings. As Aaron Wildavsky noted: "[i]f this had been an ordinary contract, a speedy
settlement, with the normal amount of haggling over the precise amount, might have been
expected. But there were men who were determined to prevent the payment of termination
costs and to embarrass the [Eisenhower] Administration even further." A. WILDAVSKY, supra
note 34, at 267.
Wildavsky believed that the Supreme Court's decision was harsh. He thought that the
Court could have characterized Wenzell's activity as contrary to public policy, but grant Mis-
sissippi Valley its reliance costs based upon principles of equity. Id. at 291.
42. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 566. Justice Harlan, in dissent, strictly construed sec-
tion 434, which would have relieved Wenzell of culpability. His concern, and the concern of
many scholars today, was how an official would know to disqualify himself for a conflict of
interest on the basis of the "illusive factors" and "subtle niceties" inherent in Justice Warren's
opinion. Mississippi Valley Generating Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 505, 571 (Ct. Cl.
1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
43. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 563. The Court indicated that the only way to fully
protect the public was to allow the government to disaffirm contracts tainted by conflicts of
interest. Justice Warren stated: "If the Government's sole remedy ... is merely a criminal
prosecution against its agent.., then the public will be forced to bear the burden of complying
with the very sort of contract which the statute sought to prevent." Id.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Crandon v. United States, noted that
"Congress appropriately enacts prophylactic rules that are intended to prevent even the ap-
pearance of wrongdoing and that may apply to conduct that has caused no actual injury to the
United States." 110 S. Ct. 997, 1005 (1990) (citing Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 562).
44. TRW Envtl. Safety Sys. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 33 (1989), appeal docketed, No.
90-5013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1989) (applying the standard to a disappointed bidder); NK4
Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 585 (applying the standard to the government) vacated,
805 F.2d 372 (Fed. Cir. 1986); CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 352 (enforcing a
criminal statute), rev'd, 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983); United Tel. Co. of the Northwest,
GSBCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108 (May 17, 1989) (enforcing a civil statute).
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the lower courts' attempts to apply Mississippi Valley are confusing, if not
arguably inconsistent.45
II. LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF MISSISSIPPI VALLEY
A. NKF Engineering and CACI, Inc.-Federal: The Federal Circuit's
Application of Mississippi Valley
In CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, the United States Claims Court
considered an unsuccessful offeror's protest of an award of an automated
data processing (ADP) contract on the basis of a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 208.' Section 208 is a criminal conflict of interest statute that prohibits
discussions about offers of employment between a government contract bid-
der and a government employee involved in a solicitation.47 Section 434, the
conflict of interest statute that the Court construed in Mississippi Valley, is
the predecessor to section 208.48
In CACI, Inc.-Federal, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested pro-
posals for an ADP contract for the Information Systems Support Group
(ISSG) of DOJ's Antitrust Division.49 CACI, Inc.-Federal alleged that
there were conflicts of interest involving the personnel of DOJ and the ap-
parent winning bidder, Sterling Systems, Inc.5 ° Specifically, CACI, Inc.-
Federal maintained that there was a conflict of interest between members of
the government's Technical Evaluation Board5" and an officer of Sterling,
45. See infra text accompanying notes 197-208.
46. 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The applicable statute provides in pertinent part that:
[W]hoever, being an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States
Government... participates personally and substantially as a Government officer or
employee, through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering
of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in a... contract .... or other particular matter
in which, to his knowledge, he ... is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning
prospective employment has a financial interest ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 208(a) (West Supp. 1990). Penalties for a violation include up to $10,000 in fines
and up to two years in prison. Id. § 216.
47. 719 F.2d at 1567.
48. See Perkins, Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1134 (1963)
(detailing the development of sections 434 and 208, and other conflict of interest statutes).
49. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 1 Cl. Ct. 352, 353, rev'd, 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
50. Id.
51. The government evaluator of a contract is usually the contracting officer. That officer,
however, may utilize other persons to assist in the selection process. For large or complicated
solicitations, agencies will use a board of persons either to make the entire decision, or to make
a preliminary decision on the technical merit of the proposal. In TR W, for example, the deci-
sionmaking entity was a panel called the Source Evaluation Board. See TRW Envtl. Safety
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 33, 38-39 appeal docketed, No. 90-5013 (Fed. Cir. Oct.
24, 1989). In CA CI, Inc. -Federal, the contracting officer made the final decision but based his
analysis, in part, on the findings of a panel known as the Technical Evaluation Board. That
1246 [Vol. 39:1239
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Robert Stevens. Stevens, the former Chief of ISSG,52 directed Sterling's
preparation of its proposal in response to the request for proposals for the
ISSG contract.53 Three members of the government's technical evaluation
board had a prior social and professional relationship with Stevens: Terence
Sweeney was Stevens' former colleague at the Federal Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, Carl Anderson was Stevens' former colleague at a private com-
pany; and Patricia Shelton was Stevens' former employee at ISSG.54 In
sum, only one of the five members of the Technical Evaluation Board did not
have a prior social or professional relationship with Stevens."
The Claims Court enjoined DOJ from awarding the contract to Sterling
noting that "judicial and statutory authorities ... would characterize the
proposed award to Sterling as illegal by reason of the relationships, contacts,
and actions described in the trial record. ' '56 The court relied specifically on
Mississippi Valley, noting that, because of ethical standards, the Supreme
Court required the cancellation of a contract already in existence and under-
way.57 The Claims Court stated that the issue presented in CA CI, Inc. -Fed-
eral was analogous to the issue in Mississippi Valley. The court
characterized the issue as whether the ethical standards set forth in Missis-
sippi Valley, which allowed for the cancellation of a contract during perform-
ance, were sufficient to enjoin the formation of a contract.58 In support of its
holding enjoining the contract award, the Claims Court stated that the rec-
board made the technical evaluation of all proposals and submitted its recommendation to the
contracting officer. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 719 F.2d at 1570.
52. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 1 Cl. Ct. at 354.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Stevens' tenure as Chief of ISSG ended in late 1980. His successor was Terence Swee-
ney, who had worked for ISSG since 1979 and had reported directly to Stevens when Stevens
was Chief. Their professional association dated back to 1978, when both worked at the Food
and Drug Administration. Stevens and Sweeny were friends who "'worked together very in-
tensely for two years'" at DOJ. Id. Sweeney helped draft and develop the RFP and was a
member of the Technical Evaluation Board, a board designed to determine the technical ac-
ceptability of the proposals for the ADP contract. Id.
Carl Anderson was the Chief of the Data Processing Unit in ISSG at the time of trial. He
helped draft the statement of work for the RFP and was Chairman of the Technical Evalua-
tion Board. Anderson's professional association with Stevens dated back to 1971, when they
worked together for a private company. Id. at 354.
Patricia Shelton was Chief of the Litigation Services Unit at ISSG at the time of trial. She,
too, was a member of the Technical Evaluation Board and had worked under Stevens at DOJ.
Durwin Smith was a member of the Data Processing Unit at ISSG and a member of the
technical evaluation board. In addition, Anderson, Sweeney, Shelton, and Smith had social
relationships with Stevens. Id. at 354-55.
56. Id at 362.
57. Id. at 362-63.
58. Id at 363.
1990] 1247
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ord was replete with circumstances in which Stevens and his former ISSG
associates "exceeded the bounds of propriety, and thus created at least the
appearance of and the opportunity for impropriety discussed in Mississippi
Valley." 59
Notwithstanding the Claims Court's reliance on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Mississippi Valley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the Claims Court's decision to enjoin the award of the
contract." Judge Friedman, writing the court's opinion, suggested that the
Claims Court did not clearly state the precise grounds upon which it en-
joined the award.61 While noting that the Claims Court discussed the crimi-
nal conflict of interest sections of the Ethics in Government Act, Judge
Friedman stressed that the Claims Court did not hold that DOJ violated
these provisions.62 Moreover, the court surmised that "[t]he rationale of
[the Claims Court's] decision appears to be that the relationships between
Stevens .. .and ... members of the Technical Evaluation Committee[ ]
created a sufficient opportunity for and appearance of impropriety that the
award of the contract ... would be 'arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion.' ,,63
In reaching its decision in CA CI, Inc.-Federal, the Federal Circuit relied
in part on a DOJ ruling issued before Stevens started work on the project for
Sterling." The DOJ ruling stated that "Mr. Stevens would be qualified to
manage Sterling's proposal activities, represent Sterling with respect to the
[proposal for the ADP contract] and manage Sterling's performance on the
resulting contract., 65 Based on the DOJ ruling and the record, the court
concluded that no person had violated the conflict of interest statutes, that
the record did not contain conclusive evidence of actual bias or favoritism on
the part of any DOJ employees toward Sterling, and that no appearance of
impropriety in the award of the contract to Sterling justified enjoining the
award.66 After meticulously analyzing the facts of the case, Judge Friedman
ruled that the ISSG showed no favoritism to Sterling.
59. Id. at 366 (footnote omitted).
60. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 719 F.2d 1567, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
61. Id at 1575.
62. Id. at 1581.
63. Id. In F. Alderete General Contractors, Inc. v. United States, Judge Cowen wrote: "[i]t
would be intolerable for any frustrated bidder to render uncertain for a prolonged period of
time government contracts which are vital to the functions performed by the sovereign." 715
F.2d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1303 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
64. CACI Inc.-Federal, 719 F.2d at 1576.
65. Id
66. Id at 1575.
67. Id. at 1582.
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The Federal Circuit also dismissed the Claims Court's reliance on Missis-
sippi Valley, stating that the holding in that case "rested solely on the
Court's conclusion that the government employee had violated the conflict
of interest statute., 68 In CA CI, Inc. -Federal, the Claims Court did not reach
such a conclusion. Therefore, the Federal Circuit maintained that the broad
language in Mississippi Valley did not apply in CACI, Inc.-Federal because
the factual context of the two cases differed.69
In NKF Engineering, Inc. v. United States, the Claims Court, believing
that it was following the rule in CACI, Inc.-Federal, held that if a disap-
pointed bidder is able to show only the appearance of impropriety, the court
should not disqualify an otherwise acceptable bidder.7° NKF Engineering
sued the United States in the Claims Court for improperly disqualifying
NKF Engineering from a contract competition because of an employee's al-
leged violation of a criminal conflict of interest statute.7" The controversy in
NKF Engineering arose from a government contract to provide engineering
services for Navy ships."2 The request for proposals (RFP) for the engineer-
ing services contract originated from a sub-group of the Naval Sea Systems
Command headed by Deputy Director Yip Park.7" Park was a Navy civil-
ian employee with 30 years of Navy contracting experience. The Navy
named Park to be the contracting officer's technical representative and
Chairman of the Contract Award Review Panel (CARP), the government
board appointed to oversee the contractor selection process.74
Holding these two positions, Park was responsible for the evaluation
plan, 7 5 the government's labor mix and cost estimates, 76 and the technical
68. Id. at 1581.
69. Id.
70. NKF Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 585, 592-93, vacated, 805 F.2d 372 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). An agency will consider a bidder acceptable if the bidder is both "responsive" and
"responsible." The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines responsiveness, stating that
"[t]o be considered for award, a bid must comply in all material respects with the invitation for
bids. Such compliance enables all bidders to stand on an equal footing and maintains the
integrity of the sealed bidding system." Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R.
§ 14.301(a) (1989). Thus, a bid is responsive where the only defects in the bid are minor
informalities or irregularities which are "a matter of form and not of substance." Id § 14.405.
A bidder is "responsible" if it can or will perform as promised. A contracting officer makes
the responsibility determination after choosing the winning bidder but before awarding the
contract. See J. CIaINIC & R. NASH, supra note 7, at 400-01.
71. NKFEng'g, 9 Cl. Ct. at 590.
72. Id. at 587.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. In a negotiated procurement, the evaluation of proposals is, according to the FAR,
"an assessment of both the proposal and the offeror's ability.., to successfully accomplish the
prospective contract." The FAR also requires an agency to evaluate the proposals "solely on
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weighting formula." Park learned the number of offerors for the contract
that the Navy had chosen for the second stage of the competition; 7 he also
knew NKF Engineering's rank in comparison to the other offerors after
CARP evaluated the initial proposals.79 Most importantly, Park knew that
of the five offerors selected to participate in oral and written discussions,"0
two offerors for the contract, NKF Engineering and Weidlinger, had re-
ceived almost identical rankings on their technical proposals while NKF En-
gineering's proposed total cost estimate was $2.5 million greater than
Weidlinger's estimate.8"
One year after the government received the initial proposals under the
RFP, Park announced his retirement and began contacting private compa-
nies for employment.8 2 One of the companies that Park contacted was NKF
Engineering." Park interviewed with NKF Engineering's president who
asked that Park check with the appropriate Naval personnel to confirm that
the Navy would not consider NKF Engineering's employment of Park a
conflict of interest.8 4 Park, in fact, never checked with the Navy legal coun-
sel.8" He told the President, however, that the Naval legal counsel had as-
sured Park that there was no problem with NKF Engineering employing
Park.8 6 Based on Park's oral assurances, NKF Engineering's president of-
fered Park a consulting job.8 7 At that time, neither the president nor anyone
else at the company knew of Park's extensive involvement in the Naval engi-
neering services contract.88
the factors specified in the solicitation." Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 15.608
(1989).
76. The Federal Circuit described the labor mix as the government's estimate of the
amount of services that it anticipates needing from each of the labor categories described in the
request for proposals. NKF Eng'g, 805 F.2d at 373 n. 1.
77. Id. at 373.
78. In a negotiated procurement, the contracting officer examines the initial proposals and
determines which contractors should be involved in the next round of oral and written discus-
sions. Those contractors are said to be in the "competitive range." The FAR states that
offerors in the competitive range are those that have a "reasonable chance of being selected for
award." Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 15.609(a) (1989).
79. NKF Eng'g, 9 Cl. Ct. at 588.
80. See supra note 78 (defining "competitive range").
81. NKFEng'g, 9 Cl. Ct. at 588.
82. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that the government challenged the retirement an-
nouncement, finding that fact "clearly erroneous." The court never resolved the issue noting
that it was irrelevant to the court's decision. NKF Eng'g. 805 F.2d at 374 n.2.
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Three months after Park began working for NKF Engineering, the com-
pany submitted its best and final offer for the Naval contract.8 9 NKF Engi-
neering's final offer was significantly lower in price than its first offer.
According to the Claims Court, two reasons explained the lower cost esti-
mate. 9 First, DOJ substantially decreased the technical requirements of the
contract by amending the solicitation.9" Second, NKF Engineering decided
it would have to lower the final cost proposal to win the competition for the
contract because the government had indicated that the first proposal was
too high.92 With this in mind, NKF Engineering re-evaluated the entire
proposal and significantly reduced its original bid.93
The Navy evaluation panel scored each proposal. Weidlinger received the
highest technical score and NKF Engineering the second highest.94 Yet,
when the evaluation panel weighted technical score along with each bidder's
cost, NKF Engineering received the highest overall score.95 Soon after the
panel issued its report on the competition results, the contracting officer for
the Naval engineering contract indicated that Park's involvement in NKF
Engineering's preparation of its final offer could present a conflict of inter-
est.96 Naval officials reviewed the potential conflict and, with their concur-
rence, the contracting officer disqualified NKF Engineering because of the
conflict of interest.97 The Navy based NKF Engineering's disqualification
on the fact that the reduction in cost estimates was unprecedented in con-
tracting competitions. Such a cost swing, the Navy concluded, must have
resulted from "inside" Navy information that Park passed on to NKF Engi-
neering during the competition for the contract.9"
The Claims Court, however, reversed the contracting officer's decision to
disqualify NKF Engineering because of the conflict of interest.99 The court,
citing CACI, Inc.-Federal, held that the "mere appearance of impropriety"
alone is not a sustainable basis for the disqualification of an otherwise ac-
ceptable offeror."° The Claims Court noted that the Federal Circuit, in
CACI, Inc.-Federal, stated that a court could not withhold award of a con-
89. Id.
90. NKF Eng'g, 9 Cl. Ct. at 594.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 588-94.
93. NKF Engineering's original cost proposal was $16.7 million; its best and final offer
was $11.2 million, a 33% decrease in NKF's initial pricing. Id at 588.
94. Id




99. Id. at 596.
100. Id. at 593.
1990] 1251
Catholic University Law Review
tract based solely on the appearance of impropriety." °" Applying the CACI,
Inc.-Federal rule, the Claims Court stated that, as a matter of law, the con-
tracting officer's decision was erroneous." 2
Yet, on appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court ruling."' 3
The Federal Circuit stated that the Claims Court misread the CA CI, Inc.-
Federal decision." 4 Judge Baldwin, writing for the court, suggested that
read properly, CACI, Inc.-Federal simply "prohibit[s] the agency from re-
jecting the relevant bidder where the facts of the case do not support a find-
ing of an appearance of impropriety."' °5 The court explained that its
holding in CA CI, Inc. -Federal did not mean that such prohibition applied in
all cases;" 6 rather, "the result would depend upon the circumstances of each
case."' °7 The court noted that in both CACI, Inc.-Federal and NKF Engi-
neering, the agency's award of the contract was founded on a rational basis
and did not warrant the Claims Court's interference in the procurement pro-
cess.1o Analyzing the facts in NKF Engineering, the Federal Circuit stated
that the contracting officer's decision that the conflict of interest amounted
to an appearance of impropriety was neither irrational nor unreasonable."09
The court, noting Park's involvement with the RFP before leaving the gov-
ernment, concluded that the facts of NKF Engineering sufficiently demon-
strated a basis on which the contracting officer made a rational decision to
disqualify NKF Engineering."o
B. United Telephone: The General Services Board of Contract Appeals'
Application of Mississippi Valley
Courts have also construed civil conflict of interest statutes. A recent case
is United Telephone Company of the Northwest. "' In United Telephone, the
General Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA), an administrative
body which hears automatic data processing contract protests, considered
101. Id.
102. Id








111. GSBCA No. 1003 1-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108 (May 17, 1989), appeal docketed
sub nom. U.S. West Communications Servs., Inc. v. United States, Nos. 89-1662, 90-1052
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, Nov. 2, 1989).
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United Telephone's protest over the potential award of an ADP contract to
United States West.' 12
The Department of Energy (DOE) conducts research and development
and stores nuclear waste at the Hanford site in Washington.113 Pursuant to
a maintenance and operations contract with DOE, Westinghouse had au-
thority to enter into subcontracts only when DOE directed or authorized the
use of subcontractors. As such, Westinghouse was considered a procuring
agent of DOE; thus, subcontracts by Westinghouse amounted to federal
agency procurements. United Telephone, the disappointed bidder, protested
the potential award of one such subcontract at the GSBCA."' United Tele-
phone alleged that Jack Smith, a former DOE employee who retired to work
for an engineering consulting firm, "had access to 'inside information' con-
cerning the [ADP contract] proposals, the evaluation plan, the competitive
positions of offerors, and other confidential information."' "5 Further, Smith
used this information to assist the winning bidder, United States West, in
preparation of its final offer for the ADP contract. Specifically, United Tele-
phone alleged that Smith provided United States West with procurement
sensitive information and held discussions with contracting officials that
gave United States West an "unfair competitive advantage" in bidding for
the ADP contract." 6 United Telephone claimed that, because United States
West had acquired information about the requirements of the contract that
no contractor was allowed to have, the winning bidder had a material advan-
tage over other bidders." 7
112. Id. at 111,190.
113. United Tel. Co. of the Northwest, GSBCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 21,916,
at 110,270, appeal docketed sub nom U.S. West Communications Servs., Inc. v. United States,
Nos. 89-1662, 90-1052 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, Nov. 2, 1989).
114. Id. (denying motion to dismiss). The General Services Board of Contract Appeals has
bid protest jurisdiction in automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) procurements by fed-
eral agencies. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Ap-
peals, 792 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 40 U.S.C.A. § 759 (West Supp. 1990). Only
"interested parties" may bring a protest involving an ADPI contract. An interested party is
either an actual bidder (one who has submitted a bid) or a prospective bidder (one who is
considering submitting a bid), whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award
of the contract. Id. § 759(f)(9)(A).
The Board has held that its standard of review allows it to make a de novo review of the
entire protest. It will not defer to the agency's judgment, nor will it make any presumption of
the agency's correctness. Thus, the Board's review exceeds the "rational basis" standard of
other forums such as the Claims Court. Computer Lines, GSBCA No. 8206-P, 86-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 18,653 (December 18, 1985).
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Rejecting DOE's motion to dismiss United Telephone's protest, Adminis-
trative Law Judge Borwick, writing for the GBSCA, relied on Mississippi
Valley. 1 8 The Judge noted that the Supreme Court had sanctioned the rem-
edy of voiding contracts for violations of laws governing conflicts of inter-
ests. 1 9 He explained that United Telephone had alleged facts which, if
proven, would show a violation of a conflict of interest statute requiring the
GSBCA to prevent the award. 2 Although the opinion mentioned no spe-
cific conflict of interest statute, the GSBCA denied DOE's motion to
dismiss. 121
In a separate opinion, Judge Borwick concluded that Smith's actions as a
consultant did violate a conflict of interest statute codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7215.122 Section 7215, enacted when Congress created DOE, prohibits
former DOE employees from appearing before or writing a letter to DOE on
behalf of a contractor if that former employee was involved in the contract
while employed by DOE.1 21 Partly because of the violation of section 7215,
Judge Borwick held that awarding the contract to United States West would
not protect the public's interest and would not result in a procurement
founded on a fair and competitive basis. 124
Judge Borwick concluded that the facts in United Telephone required the
GSBCA to enjoin the award of the contract to United States West for two
reasons:12 5 First, Smith's activities and the resulting conflict of interest cre-
ated a contract competition that was not fair to the other offerors, specifi-
cally, United Telephone; second, United States West violated a federal
acquisition regulation that prohibited discussions between the agency and a
single competitor after the submission of final offers. 126 Judge Borwick indi-
118. Id. at 110,274; Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 520 (1960).
119. United Tel., GBSCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 21,916, at 110,274 (citing
Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 563).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 110,275.
122. United Tel., GSBCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108.
42 U.S.C. § 7215 provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), no supervisory employee shall, within
one year after his employment with the Department has ceased, knowingly -
(A) make any appearance or attendance before, or
(B) make any written or oral communication to, and with the intent to influ-
ence the action of;
the Department if such appearance or communication relates to any particular
matter which is pending before the Department.
42 U.S.C. § 7215 (a)(l) (1988).
123. United Tel., GBSCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108, at 111,206.




Snares, Snags, and Spring-Guns
cated that the facts in United Telephone offered a compelling reason to apply
the Supreme Court's Mississippi Valley principle to violations of a civil con-
flict of interest statute."27 The GSBCA granted United Telephone a perma-
nent injunction and required Westinghouse to award the contract to United,
partly because of the violation of the conflict of interest statute. 12 Westing-
house appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit. The appeal is pending. 12
9
Despite the court's partial reliance on reasons other than the conflict of
interest for granting United Telephone an injunction, United Telephone
stands largely for the principle that where a disappointed bidder shows a
clear violation of a conflict of interest statute, the GSBCA will prevent the
award. 130 The Federal Circuit has not yet tested the principle, as applied to
a violation of a civil conflict of interest statute, in any appealed GSBCA or
Claims Court case. 1 '
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AT THE CLAIMS COURT: TR W
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY SYSTEMS V. UNITED STATES
A. Legislative History of the Claims Court's Injunctive Power: Section
1491(a)(3) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act
After the United States Supreme Court's Mississippi Valley decision, Con-
gress reorganized the United States Court of Claims and created the United
States Claims Court.'3 2 Congress empowered the new Claims Court with
equitable power to enjoin the government from awarding a contract under
section 1491(a)(3) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act. 1 3 3 Section
1491(a)(3) provides that in pre-award protests, 134 the Claims Court may
grant declaratory judgments, including injunctive relief.' 35 Thus, Congress
127. The statute violated in Mississippi Valley was a criminal statute. See supra note 23.
128. United Tel., GBSCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 22,108, at 111,210.
129. United Tel. Company of the Northwest, GSBCA No. 1003 1-p, 89-3 B.C.A. 22,191
(Aug. 31, 1989) (denying stay pending appeal).
130. Id. 22,108, at 111,208. Judge Borwick cited United States v. Medico Industries,
Inc., 784 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1986), for the analogous proposition that criminal conflict of
interest statutes provide a "'sharp rule' mandating termination of contracts tainted with con-
flict of interest regardless of [the] fact that inside information [was] not revealed." Id.
131. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals from both the United
States Claims Court and the General Services Board of Contract Appeals. See J. CImNIC & R.
NASH, supra note 7, at 1009.
132. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 133(a), 96 Stat. 25,
40 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988)).
133. Id.
134. See supra note 12 (discussing the types of bid protests and the forums in which they
may be brought).
135. The statute provides:
1990] 1255
Catholic University Law Review
greatly expanded the court's power to remedy violations of procurement
statutes. With injunctive relief available, the disappointed bidder can obtain
complete relief in pre-award bid protest cases if the Claims Court finds that
the facts of the case warrant an injunction.
Both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Committee
issued reports addressing the Claims Court's new injunctive power. 136 The
Senate Judiciary Committee Report observed that courts usually avoid inter-
fering in the procurement process.137 The Committee noted that courts typi-
cally refuse to enjoin the government from awarding a contract to the
government's selected winner. 138 By emphasizing the court's historical re-
luctance to interfere in the procurement process, the Senate intended to sig-
nal that the Claims Court should continue its limited role in the government
contracting process, despite the new injunctive powers.
The House Judiciary Committee also stated that the Claims Court should
rarely use its injunctive power' 39 and emphasized that the public has a
"strong interest" in the ability of the government to fulfill its contract re-
quirements at the lowest possible cost."4 Because the public's money was at
issue, the House Committee warned the courts not to interfere in the con-
tracting process unless necessary, so as to avoid adding to the cost of govern-
ment procurement.
The House Judiciary Committee, however, purported to have an addi-
tional purpose for approving section 1491(a)(3). The House was not only
interested in a cost effective government contracting system, but also a law-
ful contracting system.' 4 ' The House Committee Report stated that the
government "must respect the rule of law. If it deviates from that norm, it
must be accountable for its actions in the courts, which are equipped with
To afford complete relief on any contract claim brought before the contract is
awarded, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments
and such equitable and extraordinary relief as it deems proper, including but not
limited to injunctive relief. In exercising this jurisdiction, the court shall give due
regard to the interests of national defense and national security.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (a)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
136. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 23; H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1981), reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Courts Improvement'Act of 1982 (avail-
able at the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit library).
137. Congress intended that "the Government ... be permitted to exercise its right to
conduct business with those suppliers it selects and to do so in an expeditious manner." S.
REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 33.
138. Id.
139. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 136, at 43.
140. Id. This philosophy stems from the fact that the government utilizes public funds to
purchase goods and services. Id.
141. Id.
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certain powers to redress proven wrongs."142 With this statement, the
House admonished the courts to protect the public from illegal agency ac-
tions such as conflicts of interest in the procurement process.
B. The Courts' Interpretation of Section 1491(a)(3)
The seminal case143 in which the court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3)
and its legislative history is United States v. John C. Grimberg Co. " In this
case, Grimberg, the disappointed bidder, filed a post-award complaint,145
protesting that the winning bidder had violated a clause in the invitation for
bids regarding the use of subcontractors. 1  The complaint sought termina-
tion of the contracts awarded to the winning bidder and the re-awarding of
the same contracts to the disappointed bidder.147 Grimberg presented the
issue of whether the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable re-
lief in a suit brought after the government awarded the contract. 4 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Claims
Court may exercise its new equitable powers only when the protestor dis-
putes the contract award during the pre-award stage. 149 Thus, the Federal
Circuit excluded post-award bid protests from the Claims Court's jurisdic-
tion and solidified the Claims Court's remedial powers in pre-award bid
protests.
In Grimberg, the Federal Circuit stated that the disappointed bidders'
claim on the contract arose from the government's breach of an "implied
duty of fair bid evaluation."' 50 The court asserted that this implied duty to
consider and evaluate each bid fairly amounted to an implied contract,
which the government breached. In finding an implied contract for fair bid
evaluation, the court defined the solicitation of bids as an offer "to evaluate
142. See H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 136, at.43.
143. See D. ARNAVAS & W. RUBERRY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GUIDEBOOK, ch. 21, at
16 (1986).
144. 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
145. Id.
146. The invitation for bids required bidders to provide subcontractors that the bidders did
not completely control. The purpose of the requirement was to eliminate subcontractor shop-
ping after award. Id at 1364 n.2.
147. Id. at 1363.
148. Id. at 1365.
149. Id. at 1369 (finding extensive support in the legislative history).
150. CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1973); see also J.
CIBINIC & R. NASH, supra note 7, at 1006 (citing Heyer Prods. v. United States, 140 F. Supp.
409 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (holding that the disappointed bidder was entitled to damages measured by
bid preparation costs if the bidder could show that the government did not evaluate the bid in
good faith)).
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each bid fairly and honestly."'' The contractor's submission of the bid
amounted to an acceptance. Thus, the bargained for exchange required in
every contract was the government's promise to fairly and honestly evaluate
each bid in exchange for the contractor's bid preparation efforts. 152 The
Federal Circuit identified this implied contract for fair bid evaluation as an
implied contract which the Federal Courts Improvement Act created. 153
The court's interpretation of its injunctive authority in Grimberg relied
substantially on its interpretation of the legislative history of section
1491 (a)(3). 54 The legislative history indicated that Congress intended for
the Claims Court to interfere with the government agency's award of a con-
tract only if the court found the agency's decision to be "arbitrary and capri-
cious."' 55 The Claims Court later explained that where a government
agency's contract award decision is arbitrary and capricious, the disap-
pointed bidder can recover on an implied contract for fair bid evaluation if
the disappointed bidder shows a clear violation of a procurement statute. 156
In the alternative, the disappointed bidder has to show that there was "no
rational basis" for the government agency's contract award decision.' 57
After Congress empowered the Claims Court with equitable relief powers,
the court continued its long standing policy that not every violation of a
statute amounted to an infraction so egregious that the disappointed bidder
could recover on a claim for breach of the implied contract for fair bid evalu-
ation. 5 ' The rule remained that government contractors could recover only
where there was a clear and prejudicial violation of a statute. 159 Moreover,
the Claims Court defined a prejudicial violation of a statute as a violation
that harmed the disappointed bidder's chances to win a government con-
151. Grimberg, 702 F.2d at 1367.
152. Id. at 1367 n.8.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1365.
155. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 23.
156. Electro-Methods, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 755, 762 (1985) (citing DeMat Air,
Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 197, 202 (1983)).
157. DeMat Air, Inc., 2 Cl. Ct. at 202.
158. Id.
159. See CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Here, the Federal Circuit held that a bidder must "establish sufficient prejudice" resulting
from violation of a procurement regulation or statute to be entitled to relief. Id. at 465.
The disappointed bidder, CACI Field Services, challenged the award of a contract to the
apparent winning bidder on two grounds. First, CACI Field Services charged that the con-
tracting officer had been too vague when holding the oral and written discussions regarding the
inadequacies of its proposal. CACI Field Services alleged that it did not know further changes
in its proposal were necessary to become competitive because the contracting officer was not
specific enough about suggested changes. Second, CACI Field Services charged that the con-
tracting officer did not adhere to the evaluation factors in the solicitation. Accordingly, CACI
(Vol. 39:12391258
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tract."6 Thus, by requiring prejudice, the Claims Court followed the legisla-
tive history that admomshed the court to construe strictly section
1491(a)(3).
C. TRW Environmental Safety Systems v. United States: Application of
the United States Claims Court's Injunctive Power
In TRW Environmental Safety Systems v. United States,'6 1 the Claims
Court considered a bid protest in which TRW, the disappointed bidder, sued
the government for breach of an implied contract for fair bid evaluation.
The TR W controversy arose from a DOE request for proposals on a $1 bil-
lion nuclear waste cleanup contract. 16 2 The contract required the winning
bidder to site-test, build, and operate a nuclear repository in Yucca Moun-
tain, Nevada.1 63 DOE estimated that the nuclear repository would eventu-
ally cost $35 billion. 1 The project called for a tunnel to honeycomb 1,500
acres inside Yucca Mountain for a total length of 112 miles. 1 65 DOE esti-
mated that it would hold about 63,500 tons of nuclear waste. 16 6 Experts
calculated that with trucks arriving at Yucca Mountain every workday at
90-minute intervals, the government would take 28 years to transport the
nuclear waste to the mountain. 1
67
After DOE evaluated the contract proposals, the agency unofficially
awarded the contract to Bechtel Systems Management, Inc. (Bechtel), the
company that had placed first in the competition for the contract.1 68 The
disappointed bidder, TRW, placed second. 169 TRW protested the potential
Field Services argued that the contracting officer did not fairly and honestly evaluate its propo-
sal.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, noting that the disappointed bidder must prove a
"'clear and prejudicial' violation of a procurement statute or regulation." Id. at 466. Most
significantly, Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit stated that prejudice is a separate
element which the disappointed bidder must prove to recover. Id; see also Kinetic Structures
Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 387, 394 (1984); DeMat Air, Inc., 2 Cl. Ct. at 202.
160. Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (noting that "if
one thing is plain in this area it is that not every irregularity, no matter how small or immate-
rial, gives rise to the right to be compensated for the expense of undertaking the bidding
process").
161. 18 CI. Ct. 33 (1989), appeal docketed, No. 90-5013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1989).
162. Id at 36.
163. Id. at 36-37.
164. Grossman, A Nuclear Dump: The Experiment Begins, DISCOVER March, 1989, at 49-
56 (providing a survey addressing the complete project).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id at 50. DOE has indicated that after 10,000 years, the waste will lose its toxicity.
Id
168. Id at 41.
169. Id.
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award, alleging that a DOE employee violated the agency conflict of interest
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7216.170 The DOE conflict of interest statute prohib-
ited former employees of energy companies' 7 ' from participating in contract
award decisions within a year of joining DOE. 172 TRW asserted that Sam
Rousso violated section 7216 by accepting and functioning in the position of
Chairman of the Source Evaluation Board 173 (SEB), the DOE group
charged with selecting the contractor for the Yucca Mountain contract.
TRW maintained that Rousso violated section 7216 by substantially partici-
pating in the Yucca Mountain contract award within a year of leaving the
employment of a Bechtel subcontractor for the Yucca Mountain project. 74
The Claims Court agreed with TRW's claim. The court held that Rousso
had violated section 7216 by his actions as Chairman, which required him to
make procedural and substantive determinations regarding the SEB's con-
tractor selection process. 17  In view of Rousso's participation on the SEB,
the court found a clear violation of section 7216.176 Having found that
Rousso violated the conflict of interest statute, the court stated that TRW
did not have to prove that the violation prejudiced the company in order to
succeed on the merits.' 77
The Claims Court's decision to enjoin the award rested in large part on
the legislative history of section 7216. The court reasoned that if Congress
170. DOE's conflict of interest statute provides:
For a period of one year after terminating any employment with any energy con-
cern, no supervisory employee shall knowingly participate in any Department pro-
ceeding in which his former employer is substantially, directly, or materially
involved, other than in a rulemaking proceeding which has a substantial effect on
numerous energy concerns.
42 U.S.C. § 7216 (1988).
171. DOE refers to energy companies that the conflict of interest provisions cover as "en-
ergy concerns." DOE defines an "energy concern" as any company department personnel
designated as such. Although Congress requires DOE to maintain a list of energy concerns,
DOE does not. Thus, the only indication that Science Applications International Corp.
(SAIC) was an "energy concern" for the purposes of the statute is a letter from DOE counsel
to Rousso stating that SAIC was an "energy concern." This same letter contained a warning
to Rousso about violations of section 7216. The Claims Court concluded that SAIC was in-
deed an "energy concern," in part, because of that letter and testimony to the same effect at
trial. TRW Envtl. Safety Sys., Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 33, 44-47 (discussing DOE's
definition of an energy concern and DOE's letter to Rousso), appeal docketed No. 90-5013
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1989).
172. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 51 (explaining the selection process).
174. Before joining DOE, Rousso worked for SAIC. That company was a subcontractor
which Bechtel hired to help perform the Yucca Mountain, nuclear repository contract. TR W
EnvtL Safety Sys., 18 Cl. Ct. at 44.
175. Id. at 39.
176. Id. at 64.
177. Id.
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had the same intent in enacting section 7216 as it had in enacting the conflict
of interest statute interpreted in Mississippi Valley, I7 the court could apply
the Mississippi Valley standard.17 9 Thus, the legislative history of section
7216 became highly significant.
In analyzing the statute's legislative history, the court observed that Con-
gress passed section 7216 under the Department of Energy Organization Act
(Organization Act)."I The court also noted that the Carter Administration
asked specifically that Congress include provisions in the legislation to pre-
vent conflicts of interest.18 1 Thus, Congress added section 7215 and section
7216 to the Organization Act to keep conflicts of interest out of contracts
designed to implement the nation's energy policy.
During debate over the conflict of interest statutes on the House floor,
Representative Harris, a sponsor of the DOE conflict of interest statutes,
stated that "[t]he public expects and we must demand our top energy poli-
cymaking officials to put the public's interest first-not their own private
interests, not regional interests, not the oil companies [sic] interests." 18 2
Representative Hughes displayed concern with the "revolving door" in gov-
ernment regulatory agencies, particularly in those agencies that dealt with
energy questions.18 3 He suggested that "[a]lthough this problem exists
throughout all Government regulatory agencies, those that deal with energy
questions must be of greatest concern."' 8 4 Moreover, the Senate Report on
the Organization Act emphasized that the conflict of interest statutes pro-
vided maximum assurance that the provisions would eliminate any conflicts
of interest or potential conflicts of interest.'85 With this legislative perspec-
178. The statute at issue in Mississippi Valley was 18 U.S.C. § 434 (1948) (repealed 1962).
Id. at 64-67.
179. Some scholars suggest that the Mississippi Valley standard simply does not apply
where a disappointed bidder seeks relief. Those scholars emphasize that in Mississippi Valley,
the government was attempting to disaffirm the contract. Where the disappointed bidder pro-
tests an award because of a violation of a conflict of interest statute, some commentators say
that a bidder faces the more stringent standard of "hard facts." Woehr, Agency Cancellation of
Federal Contracts for Fraud and Conflicts of Interest, 10 PuB. CONT. L. J. 386, 394 (1987)
(citing CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1575-81 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also
Culp Wesner Culp, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-212318, 84-1 CPD 17 (1983).
180. The Organization Act was the legislation the Carter Administration requested "as a
means of helping our Nation meet the energy challenge which is rapidly being thrust upon us."
123 CONG. REc. 17,281 (1977) (statement of Representative Fascell); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7216
(1988).
181. 123 CONG. REC., at 17,279-81 (1977).
182. Id. at 17,279.
183. Id. at 17,409.
184. Id.
185. S. REP. No. 164, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 854, 957.
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tive, the Claims Court found Mississippi Valley controlling where a disap-
pointed bidder violates a conflict of interest statute.8 6 Both DOE and
Bechtel have appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
18 7
IV. COMMENT: WILL THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT UPHOLD INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF FOR THE DISAPPOINTED BIDDERS IN TR W AND
UNITED TELEPHONE, AND SHOULD IT?
TR W is an unusual case because the United States Claims Court rarely
grants permanent injunctive relief where a disappointed bidder protests a
government contract award.' The Claims Court's reluctance to grant in-
junctive relief is probably based on Congress' mandate that courts review
administrative agency decisions in bid protest cases under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.'8 9 Furthermore, in bid protests where the disappointed
bidder attempts to prove a violation of a statute, the Claims Court requires
the disappointed bidder to show that the government's violation of the stat-
ute was prejudicial." 9° The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has also held that prejudice is a separate element of the claim that
the disappointed bidder must prove. 9 ' Both TR W and United Telephone,
however, stand for the proposition that where the statute violated is a civil
186. TRW Envtl. Safety Sys., Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 33, 66-67, appeal docketed,
No. 90-5013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1989).
187. Id
188. The Claims Court has enjoined the government from awarding a contract to the win-
ning bidder nine times since the court's reorganization. Claims Court Annual Reports (1982 -
May 1989) (available at the Clerk's Office, United States Claims Court); see Honeywell, Inc. v.
United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 173, rev'd, 870 F.2d 644 (Fed. Cir. 1989); NKF Eng'g, Inc. v. United
States, 9 Cl. Ct. 585, vacated, 805 F.2d 372 (Fed Cir. 1986); Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v.
United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 277 (1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (appealed and affirmed
only with regard to the application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act);
CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 352, rev'd, 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 68 (1984); Laboratory Supply Corp. v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct. 28 (1984); Related Indus., Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 517 (1983); AABCO,
Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 109 (1983), aff'd, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed. Cir. 1985); DeMat Air,
Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 197 (1983).
Of these nine cases where the Claims Court granted permanent injunctive relief, three were
appealed. Of those appealed, all were reversed by the Federal Circuit. Thus, the Federal Cir-
cuit has yet to affirm an injunction granted by the Claims Court enjoining the government
from awarding a contract to the winning bidder.
189. See supra text accompanying note 155.
190. See supra text accompanying note 159.
191. CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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conflict of interest statute, the court does not require the disappointed bidder
to show prejudice in order to win relief.192
In TR W, the Claims Court, using Mississippi Valley for support, acknowl-
edged the inherent difficulties in proving prejudice where the government
violates a conflict of interest statute.'93 According to the Claims Court,
TRW had to prove only that Rousso substantially participated in the con-
tract within the prohibited time period.194 The court stated that TRW did
not have to show that Rousso's participation in the Source Evaluation Board
harmed TRW's chances for obtaining the Yucca Mountain contract
award.195 Similarly, in United Telephone, the GSBCA stated that United
Telephone did not have to show that Smith's participation in United States
West's bid preparation harmed United Telephone's chances for obtaining the
Westinghouse contract.196
In TRW and United Telephone, the Claims Court and the GSBCA ini-
tially disregarded the Federal Circuit's prejudice requirement. 197 Both fo-
rums applied Mississippi Valley to reach the conclusion that where the
statute in question is a conflict of interest statute, the disappointed bidder
need not show prejudice.' 9" Neither the GSBCA nor the Claims Court,
however, relied solely on the finding that a contracting party violated a DOE
conflict of interest statute. Rather, both courts stated that although the dis-
appointed bidder did not have to prove prejudice, the disappointed bidder in
each case did indeed prove prejudice.' 99
Undoubtedly, both the Claims Court and the GSBCA are aware that the
Federal Circuit decisions, NKF Engineering and CA CI, Inc. -Federal, are dif-
ficult to reconcile. In CA CI, Inc.-Federal, the Federal Circuit held that the
disappointed bidder could not, recover where the disappointed bidder only
showed an appearance of impropriety.2" In contrast, the Federal Circuit, in
NKF Engineering, held that the government could disqualify a bidder based
192. TRW Envtl. Safety Sys., Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 33, 33, appeal docketed, No.
90-5013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1989); United Tel. Co. of the Northwest, GSBCA No. 10031-p, 89-
3 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 22,108 (May 17, 1989), appeal docketed sub nom. U.S. West Communica-
tions Servs., Inc. v. United States, Nos. 89-1662, 90-1052 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, Nov. 2, 1989).
193. TRWEnvtl. Safety Sys., 18 Cl. Ct. at 66.
194. Id. at 64.
195. Id. at 66 (stating that "corruption or loss need not be proven").
196. United Tel., GBSCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108, at 111,207-08.
197. Id.; TRW EnvtL Safety Sys., 18 Cl. Ct. at 66.
198. United Tel., GBSCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108, at 111,207-08; TRW
EnvtL Safety Sys., 18 Cl. Ct. at 66.
199. United Tel, GBSCA No. 10031-p, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,108, at 111,208; TRW
Envtl. Safety Sya, 18 Cl. Ct. at 66.
200. CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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on the appearance of impropriety.2" 1 Thus, both the government, in NKF
Engineering, and the disappointed bidder, in CA CI, Inc. -Federal, established
a substantial appearance of impropriety. Yet, only the government was
granted relief based upon the finding of an appearance of impropriety.2"2
One scholar asserts that the NKF Engineering and CA CI, Inc. -Federal de-
cisions are inconsistent and, thus, reveal the Federal Circuit's predisposition
toward favoring the government. 20 3 The theory implied is that the Federal
Circuit illogically applied the conflict of interest statutes to rubber-stamp
government contract award decisions.2° Significantly, the Federal Circuit
has yet to affirm a permanent injunction that the Claims Court has granted
in favor of the disappointed bidder.2 "5
Others, however, maintain that the Supreme Court never intended for the
Mississippi Valley standard to apply where the disappointed bidder seeks re-
lief, but only where the government attempts to disqualify a bidder or disaf-
firm a contract.2c6 Indeed, there are numerous examples of how the federal
procurement system is structured to favor the government.2 °7 Perhaps a
rule stating that only the government can use a conflict of interest to void a
contract is beneficial for procurement efficiency. Employing the argument
that the Mississippi Valley standard does not apply to disappointed bidders,
NKF Engineering and CACI, Inc.-Federal are much easier to reconcile.
CACI, Inc.-Federal involved a disappointed bidder's attempt to prevent a
contract award, whereas NKF Engineering involved the government's at-
tempt to disqualify a winning bidder before awarding the contract.208
The two applications of the Mississippi Valley standard in bid protests dif-
fer because of tension between competing goals of the federal procurement
system.2° The first goal emanates from the practical consideration that in
order to keep the federal procurement system running smoothly, courts must
201. NKFEng'g, 805 F.2d at 376.
202. Id. at 372.
203. Hazelton, The Federal Circuit's Emerging Role in Bid Protest Cases, 36 AMER. L.
REv. 919, 923, 932 (1987).
204. Id.
205. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
206. Woehr, supra note 179, at 394.
207. For example, the government can terminate a contract for convenience and, unlike
private contract law, the only remedy available is reliance costs. Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions, 48 C.F.R. § 49.101(a) (1989); see U.C.C. § 2-106(3) (1990) (for private law).
In deciding whether to grant injunctive relief for an unlawful procurement, the courts will
consider "whether the national welfare will be materially affected by the injunction" and
whether the procurement is "vital to the national interest." D. ARNAVAS & W. RUBERRY,
supra note 143, ch. 21, at 4.
208. See CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983); NKF
Eng'g., Inc. v. United States, 805 F.2d 372, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
209. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
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limit judicial interference in the formation stages of a contract.21° The sec-
ond goal flows from society's requirement that the legislature and courts
maintain the integrity of the federal procurement system.211 Disappointed
bidders have had difficultly recovering under any of the traditional theories
defined in CACI, Inc. -Federal,21 2 precisely because of the tension between
these two goals. Thus, the Federal Circuit should resolve the prejudice is-
sue, in the context of an alleged violation of a conflict of interest statute, to
afford a cogent evaluation of federal conflict of interest statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Conflicts of interest in federal procurement present a continuing problem
in government.21 3 Although Congress has enacted numerous bills to curb
conflicts of interest, the procuring agencies are reluctant to enforce conflict
of interest statutes. The United States Claims Court and the GSBCA are
two bid protest forums that have accepted the challenge. 2 4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, in its review of its
decisions, has not supported these two forums.21 5 Consequently, as publi-
cized procurement contracts demonstrate, conflicts of interest abound.21 6
With such publicity, citizens lose faith in the procurement process and ques-
tion the government's integrity.21 7
The Federal Circuit should address the issue of whether a disappointed
bidder must prove prejudice, due to a conflict of interest violation, to merit
an injunction. In its application of the conflict of interest statutes, the Fed-
eral Circuit must fulfill two congressionally mandated goals. Specifically,
the Federal Circuit must limit the judiciary's involvement in the government
contracting process while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of the
federal procurement system. Courts, if not the legislature, should seek to
implement the policies underlying Mississippi Valley, which emphasize that
suspicions of malfeasance and corruption destroy the people's faith in gov-
ernment. In doing so, they must seek to avoid "so many snares, snags and
210. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text; see also Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S.
520, 549 (1960); Hearings, supra note 2, at 1.
212. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 719 F.2d at 1567.
213. See Nolan, Regulating Ethics: When It's Not Enough to Just Say No, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 405, 405 (1990) (commenting that today "government ethics is a growth industry").
214. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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spring-guns that only the unwary can be recruited [for public service]." 218
By definitively resolving the issue of prejudice, the Federal Circuit will clear
confusion at lower decision-making levels. Moreover, a Federal Circuit de-
cision on the prejudice issue would, at the very least, provoke a much needed
analysis of whether the current conflict of interest legislation is furthering
either of the congressionally mandated goals in the federal procurement
system.
Shannon Haralson Renchard
218. See E. McELWAIN & J. VORENBURG, supra note 1, at 955; see also Murdock, Finally,
Government Ethics as if People Mattered: Some Thoughts on the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 502 (for a good summary of the most recent changes in conflict of
interest legislation).
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